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Abstract Online examinations are an integral com-
ponent of many online learning environments, which
face many security challenges. Collusion is seen as
a major security threat to such examinations, when a
student invites a third party to impersonate or abet in a
test. This work aims to strengthen the authentication of
students via the use of dynamic profile questions. The
study reported in this paper involved 31 online partici-
pants from five countries over a five-week period. The
results of usability and security analysis are reported.
The dynamic profile questions were more usable than
both the text-based and image-based questions (p <
0.01). An impersonation abuse scenario was simulated
using email and mobile phone. The impersonation
attack via email was not successful, however, students
were able to share answers to dynamic profile ques-
tions with a third party impersonator in real time,
which resulted in 93% correct answers. The sharing of
information via phone took place in real time during
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an online test and the response time of an imper-
sonator was significantly different (p < 0.01) than
a student. The study also revealed that a response
time factor may be implemented to identify and report
impersonation attacks.
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1 Introduction
In typical online learning environments, students are
assessed from remote locations, which raise the secu-
rity concerns of stakeholders about the integrity of
online examinations [1]. Cheating is one of the major
threats due to vulnerable authentication approaches
and the degree of difficulty to verify the identity of
remote users. Face-to-face invigilation can be expen-
sive and logistically challenging in dispersed geo-
graphical locations. However, many educational insti-
tutions prefer supervised examinations to the use of
high stake online examinations largely because of the
difficulty in the authentication of a remote user with
no face-to-face interaction [2].
Student cheats in online examinations using a num-
ber of methods. The work presented in this paper
investigates collusion attacks i.e. impersonation, when
a student invites a third party to take the test on his/her
behalf. The student shares their access credentials
via two methods: email, and instant messaging using
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mobile phone. Collusion is a challenging threat which
is difficult to detect and report after the completion of
an online examination.
This paper presents the findings of an empirical
study conducted in a real online course with remote
international participants. The work focuses on
research that aims to strengthen the authentication
of examinees via the use of a challenge questions
approach [3]. The traditional text-based challenge
questions approach requires students to register their
answers before authentication.
This allows students to store, memorize, and share
these questions with a third party to perform an imper-
sonation attack. To discourage students from sharing
their credentials, this study proposes dynamic profile
questions, which are created in the background when
a student per-forms learning activities. This study will
investigate the following:
1. The effectiveness of the proposed dynamic profile
question approach.
2. Whether a student could share dynamic pro-
file questions with a third party impersonator
using asynchronous and real-time communica-
tion methods (i.e. email and mobile phone) and
successfully perform impersonation.
The paper is organized into multiple sections start-
ing with introduction to highlight the overview and
objectives. Section 2 provides a literature review, dis-
cussion on security threats and justification for the
research work presented in this paper. Section 3 out-
lines detail of research methodology. Usability and
security findings are discussed in Sections 4 and 5.
2 Background and Related Work
The threat level of collusion in online examinations is
different from other online applications such as bank-
ing where implicit collusion is unlikely to happen [4].
Students are motivated by varying reasons to collude
in online examinations. Evans and Craig [5] identified
different reasons to collude including desire for bet-
ter grades, fear of failure, pressure from parents to do
well, unclear instructional objectives and being graded
on a curve.
A collusion attack is an organized form of cheating
which involves collaboration between a student and
a third party to solve examination problems. It is a
consensual and pre-planned cheating attack by a
student. It has an ongoing issue reported in a num-
ber of recent studies [6–8]. Collusion can be classified
in the following categories based on its occurrence in
different scenarios [9]
2.1 Impersonation
In an impersonation attack, a student shares his or her
access credentials with a third party who takes the
online test. It is difficult to detect impersonation once
an online test is completed [10]. These attacks are pre-
planned and consensual, involving legitimate students
with valid access credentials. Moini and Madni [2]
state that impersonation and illegal sharing or disclo-
sure of authentication secrets is challenging to defend
against in a remote online setting. They identified that
students invite third parties to take their online tests
for extra benefit. Such attacks are evolving with the
advent of new communication technology. A num-
ber of scenarios are presented below to describe the
potential impersonation attacks [9]
2.1.1 Credential Sharing with a Third Party via Email
(Asynchronously)
The conventional login-identifier and password is a
widely used approach for the authentication of students
in online tests. This method may provide adequate
security in many online applications. However, it is
vulnerable to attacks when students invite third parties
to take their examinations. A student is able to share
his or her access credentials prior to the test via email,
phone and instant message. Rowe [11] states that indi-
viduals share credentials with collaborators, who take
the online test on behalf of the intended test taker.
2.1.2 Credential Sharing with a Third Party
via Phone (Real Time)
The mobile phone has become an increasingly used
communication technology and an essential personal
accessory. McGee [12] identified that students may
use smartphones for information exchange during
online examinations. Howell et al. [13] reported that
students exchange answers to questions using their
phones and take photographs of exams and transmit
them to others. Paullet et al. [14] identified phone use
as a new method of cheating. They argue that the use
of browser-locking techniques may become irrelevant
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if a student has access to a smartphone during their
exam. There are two possible scenarios where a smart
phone may be used to cheat in an online test, i.e.
sharing answers to questions, and sharing access cre-
dentials for impersonation.
2.1.3 Credential Sharing with a Third Party
via Instant Messaging (IM)
Instant Messaging (IM) is another potential method to
communicate during an online examination session.
The growth of IM services is a global phenomenon,
which is rapidly changing the way people interact.
IM applications are easily available on mobile phones,
tablets and computers for little or no cost. Ease of
access makes it a potential tool for cheating in online
examinations. Examples of instant messaging appli-
cations include Skype, Viber, WhatsApp, and Phone
[15]. The prevalence and free availability of these
applications means they are gradually replacing short
messaging service (SMS) communication [16]. As of
2016, chat service WhatsApp has reached 1 billion
registered users [17]. Technology has been a useful
tool for advanced learning; however, it may also be
used by people in promoting their personal objectives,
including cheating. McGee [12] state that technol-
ogy is the most commonly used strategy to cheat in
online examinations. Research studies reported that
students with access to phones and computers use
instant messages during online examinations [18, 19].
2.1.4 Remote Desktop Sharing
Using remote desktop sharing applications, a remote
user can access and control a desktop with permission
to all programs [20]. By combining remote desktop
sharing and an online examination session, a student
may login and invite a third party to impersonate him
in an online test. Desktop sharing is reported as one of
the ten most inventive cheating attempts in eCampus
News [21]. Heussner [22] state that it could be tempt-
ing to accept help from a friend or helper remotely
using technology including remote desktop sharing.
This enables a third party in the next room, or even in
a different city, country and time zone, to impersonate
a test taker. This type of attack is pre-planned and the
student and attacker agree a time to perform the test.
The security measures such as “secure browser” [23]
can mitigate the use of instant messaging (on personal
computer), Internet browser access, and remote desk-
top sharing during an examination session [24]. How-
ever, students may still circumvent the security and
share their credentials with a third party using email
and mobile phone.
2.2 Authentication Approaches
The conventional authentication approaches fall into
three categories based on “what you know” e.g. pass-
word and secret information “what you have?” e.g. a
smart card and “what you are” e.g. biometrics [25].
These methods are driven by knowledge, objects and
human characteristics. The existing methods satisfy
identity and authentication to ensure that the correct
student has access to an online test. However, based on
the literature review and evaluation of potential threats
above, it has been identified that an authenticated
student is sometimes not the expected student, or an
expected student may start a test but does not complete
it. Hence, the existing mechanisms are not sufficient
to ensure that the correct student takes the online test.
Table 1 shows an overview of the existing meth-
ods in the context of impersonation threats. In the
majority of features, students may be able to share
access credentials with an impersonator. For exam-
ple, students reveal their passwords to third parties
for impersonation [26]. Apampa et al. [6] state that
an impersonator could produce correct login details
on behalf of a student, which raises the question “is
the student really who he/she claims to be?” Authen-
tication methods provide a different level of security
assurances, reliability and deterrence to impersonation
threats. According to guidelines the proposed method
needs to [27]:
• support, not prevent or disrupt, learning (usable)
• be integrated in the learning process (secure)
• be simple and flexible to deploy (usable)
• be secure, non-invasive and not diminish privacy
(secure and usable)
• be low-cost (feasible).
Knowledge Based Authentication (KBA) is the sim-
plest technique to fulfill the security requirements.
This is an easy to use method, and expected to provide
secure authentication in online examinations. This is
a low-cost, accessible, widely acceptable and pre-
ferred authentication method [28]. However, a review
of KBA methods suggests impersonation attacks are
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Table 1 Authentication
approaches and
impersonation
Authentication methods Impersonation
Knowledge-based Authentication (KBA)
Login identifier and password Can be shared with a third party
Personal challenge questions Can be shared with a third party
Object-based Authentication (OBA)
Smartcard, or magnetic card Can be shared with a third party
Biometrics
Fingerprint recognition Cannot be shared with a third party
Face recognition Cannot be shared with a third party
Signature recognition Cannot be shared with a third party
Web video recording Cannot be shared with a third party
Human invigilation
Face-to-face invigilation Cannot impersonate with identity verification
Remote monitoring (Web cam) Cannot impersonate with identity verification
inevitable. Using both challenge questions based on
personal information, and login-identifier and pass-
word, students may be able to share credentials with
third party impersonators using phone, IMs, remote
desktop and email.
Object Based Authentication (OBA) method uti-
lizes physical objects such as smart cards and mag-
netic strip cards [29]. This method is widely used
in the banking, transport and hospitality sectors
with a purpose-built infrastructure. Implementation of
these features requires special purpose input devices
and infrastructure, which incurs additional costs and
human resources. Smart cards can be shared in per-
son or by post with impersonators before online tests,
meaning the method is fallible, and vulnerable to
impersonation attacks. Furthermore, implementation
of the OBA method may be challenging to imple-
ment in dispersed geographical locations with students
needing to access online learning and examinations
from their homes and offices.
Biometric features such as fingerprint and face
recognition methods are suggested to enhance secu-
rity in online examinations [30]. Thus, it is anticipated
that only the correct student can authenticate, due to
unique physical attributes associated with individuals.
Ko and Cheng [31] proposed the use of video record-
ing of an online examination session, which may
countermeasure impersonation attacks. These features
are reported to be more reliable than KBA and OBA.
However, some studies identified issues with the use
of biometrics. Balie and Jortber [32] state that bio-
metrics require proprietary software, special purpose
hardware and broadband Internet to transmit the required
input. Unlike KBA, biometric features are associated
with an individual’s physical or behavioral character-
istics, which cannot be updated if compromised. For
example, some studies indicated that an individual’s
fingerprint can be lifted from the surfaces of objects
without one’s knowledge and used for replay attacks
[2, 33]. False Reject Rate (FRR) and False Accept
Rate (FAR) are widely known issues with these fea-
tures: Ratha et al. [34] stated that fingerprint matching
faces two common and competing errors, these being
FRR and FAR. The same issues were reported in
other biometric features, including face recognition.
In a recent study, Sahoo and Choubisa [35] identified
that the video recording feature may enhance secu-
rity, but it will require post-assessment monitoring
of exam sessions for all students, which incurs addi-
tional resources and demands extra effort [31]. This
discussion implies that biometrics is more reliable in
terms of identification; however, they are unreason-
ably intrusive, expensive and may cause difficulties in
wider implementation where students are situated in
dispersed geographical locations.
A human invigilator is an example of a secondary
authentication method which can be used to ensure
the presence of the correct student. This includes
face-to-face proctoring and remote monitoring via a
web cam. Face-to-face proctoring requires test cen-
ters and human invigilators in all locations (different
cities worldwide) where students are enrolled on an
online course. In addition, each test center requires
a review by academic staff to ensure proctor quality
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and compliance with the institution’s test center stan-
dards [32]. Student authentication that relies upon a
human invigilator will require extra human resources,
costs and allocated test centers. Remote monitoring
via webcam may be a feasible alternative to phys-
ical invigilation. A dedicated proctor is assigned to
authenticate identity and monitor an online test [36].
Students can access their tests from the home or office
without needing to go to an allocated test center. This
approach may be cost-efficient compared to face-to-
face invigilation, but there is a cost attached to remote
proctoring [36]. This approach requires one-to-one
monitoring and, therefore, would be expensive and
challenging in testing a large number of students in
dispersed geographical locations.
The above discussion suggests a need for an
authentication approach which is accessible, usable,
cost effective, and prevents collusion attacks in online
examinations.
2.3 Previous Research
In the previous work, the authors conducted multiple
studies to analyze usability and security of text-based
and image-based challenge questions in an online
examination context [37–41]. The overall findings
of the earlier studies reported varying results. The
following usability and security issues were identified.
• The conventional text-based questions with clar-
ity, relevance and ambiguity issues were less
usable. This influenced efficiency and effective-
ness during the authentication process.
• In a guessing attack, questions in some areas were
reported with security vulnerabilities as specific
questions were successfully guessed.
• The usability of image-based questions was better
than the text-based questions due to memorability
of pictures and use of multiple-choice questions
[42].
• One key issue with pre-defined text-based and
image-based questions was the ability of a stu-
dent to store, memorize and share them with an
impersonator.
• A study [43] by authors identified that an increase
in the number of questions shared, increased
the success of an impersonation attack. Also, an
increase in the profile (database) size decreased
the success of an impersonation attack.
In response to impersonation attacks identified in the
previous section and the issues identified above asso-
ciated with the use of text-based and image-based
challenge questions, this research study proposes
dynamic profile questions.
2.4 Dynamic Profile Questions
In an earlier study, Babic et al. (2009) proposed a theo-
retical approach for activity-based security questions,
which programmatically generates a security profile
based on an individual’s network and search activi-
ties for authentication of users in web applications. In
another study, Jortberg and Baile (2009) implemented
challenge questions from a US consumer database
for identification of online students in online exam-
inations. However, the database was limited to the
US consumers’ market and does not hold information
about prospective students from across the world. The
authors developed and researched text-based, image-
based and activity-based questions as discussed above
in the previous research section. Findings of these
studies were encouraging. However, there were secu-
rity challenges with these approaches which led to the
creation of dynamic profile questions.
Figure 1 shows an overview of dynamic profile ques-
tions approach, which is an adaptable method. A profile
is created dynamically based on a student’s learning
activities. Questions are created non-intrusively and
non-distractingly in the background during the learn-
ing process. These questions are extracted from a stu-
dent’s learning activities, content submissions, grades,
lessons, and forum posts in order to build and con-
solidate a profile. In order to access an online exam-
ination, the student is required to answer a subset of
questions randomly presented from his or her profile.
This study implemented multiple choice ques-
tions using a combination of distractors and correct
answers. A total of 18 dynamic profile questions were
utilized in this study which is discussed later in the
results section.
3 Research Methodology
The study was conducted in a real online learning
course. A usability test method was adopted to eval-
uate the effectiveness of dynamic profile questions.
It is a usability inspection method, which tends to
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Fig. 1 An overview of
profile based authentication
using dynamic profile
questions
focus on the interaction between humans and comput-
ers [44]. Using this method, the representative users,
i.e. students, interact with online learning and exami-
nations using dynamic profile question authentication.
Multiple abuse case scenarios were simulated to
test impersonation attacks. A risk-based security
assessment method was adopted to perform the imper-
sonation abuse case scenarios. This approach focuses
on the test of features and functions of artifacts based
on the risk of their failure using abuse case scenarios
[45]. Abuse case scenarios were simulated to analyze
impersonation attacks when students and imperson-
ators communicated asynchronously (via email) and
in real time (via a mobile phone) to share access cre-
dentials (dynamic profile questions). The study was
conducted in multiple phases, which are described in
the following sections.
• Designing PHP & MySQL Course: Online
course design plays an important role in setting
up learning goals and assessment for students.
The dynamic profile question approach utilized a
student’s learning interactions during the course
work to create and consolidate a profile; there-
fore, the course design was highly relevant. A
remote “PHP and MySQL” online course was
organized in five weekly modules, which included
lessons, forum submissions, assignments and stu-
dents’ reflections at the end of each week. The
course was set up and deployed in the MOO-
DLE Learning Management System (LMS) on a
remote web server accessible on the Internet. The
course content was released on a daily basis to
maximize participants’ engagement and learning
interactions. A total of five weekly quizzes were
set up for summative assessment. The participants
were recommended to invest 10 hours weekly
learning effort over a span of five weeks.
• Participant Recruitment: In order to recruit and
motivate participants, the course was offered free
of charge and advertised on the University of
Hertfordshire online portal (StudyNet). A total of
31 students were enrolled onto the course; how-
ever, only 21 completed the five-week course.
Of the 21 students, the majority 17(80%) were
students from United Kingdom and 1(5%) each
were from Slovakia, Kenya, Malta, and Trinidad
and Tobago. They were already enrolled in differ-
ent programs at the University of Hertfordshire
as distance learners. This was helpful for the
participants’ engagement due to their existing
knowledge of using a remote online learning envi-
ronment. In order to motivate students to perform
the security abuse case scenarios a free advanced
PHP course was offered on completion of the five
week course. Due to specialized programming
context, the course targeted computer science stu-
dents. The participation was voluntary and per-
formed with real students in order to create a real
learning context. This led to a smaller sample size.
• Registration: The students were required to email
a short introduction before registration. Guidance
notes on the registration process and an enrol-
ment key were emailed to all participants. It was
a standard MOODLE sign up process, which was
essential to create login credentials to access the
learning material. Upon successful registration,
the participants received a confirmation email to
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access the course. The course was only available
to registered users.
• Online Coursework: An instructor-led course
was taught over a period of five weeks. To collect
pertinent data for the evaluation of usability and
security, authentication results were stored in the
database. The participants were required to submit
their assignments in order to access their quizzes.
Each assignment was associated with each week’s
course content. The participants were required to
complete a quiz at the end of each week. The
course content of the following weeks were con-
ditionally released to those who completed their
quizzes – e.g. week 2 content was released to
participants who completed the week 1 quiz.
• Creating Dynamic Profile Questions: In order
to conduct the experiment in a controlled environ-
ment, dynamic profile questions were created
manually for each individual student and uploaded
to the database in their profiles via the user
interface in MOODLE. As shown in “Appendix –
Dynamic profile questions”, these questions were
created on a daily basis for each participant after
access to course content and lessons, assignment
submissions, assignment grades, quiz completions,
feedback and reflection, and forum discussions.
3.1 Simulating Abuse Case Scenarios
The following collusion abuse case scenario was sim-
ulated toward the end of week five in order to evaluate
impersonation attacks using email and phone:
Threat Scenario- A student is registered on a PHP
& MySQL programming course, which is delivered
in an online learning environment. The course uses
dynamic profile questions for the authentication of
students in summative assessments, which are acces-
sible on a secure browser with no access to unwanted
software e.g. Internet browser, chat sessions, etc. The
student is due to write his/her final semester online
test. He or she wants to boost his/her grades and
recruits a third party impersonator to help him/her to
take his test. However, to satisfy the authentication, the
student needs to share his/her dynamic profile ques-
tions and answers (access credentials) with the imper-
sonator. The impersonator would use the shared infor-
mation to answer the randomly presented dynamic
profile challenge questions during authentication in
order to access the online test.
Given the above scenario, this study simulated two
types of collusion attacks: i) a student shares dynamic
profile questions with a third party impersonator thr-
ough email (asynchronously) before an online examin-
ation session; and ii) a student shares dynamic profile
questions with a third party impersonator in real time
through themobile phoneduring anonline examination
session. Before simulating the abuse case scenarios:
• Two impersonatorswere recruited to attempt to im-
personate students in anonline examination session.
• Each impersonator was assigned a group of 10
students to simulate the abuse cases in allocated
time slots.
• Skype accounts and email addresses for each
impersonator were shared with his/her allocated
students.
• Each impersonator was required to access a sim-
ulation quiz (online examination) created on the
course on behalf of each allocated student in the
scheduled time slot.
• Each impersonator was required to answer all 18
dynamic profile questions associated with each of
his/her allocated students in order to complete the
simulation.
3.1.1 Credential Sharing with an Impersonator
via Email (Asynchronously)
Email attack was simulated as described below:
1) Students were asked to share their dynamic pro-
file questions via email.
2) Students emailed their dynamic profile questions
and login details to their allocated impersonator.
3) The impersonator accessed the online course
using the allocated student’s login details.
4) In order to access the online quiz on behalf of
a student, the impersonator was randomly pre-
sented with three dynamic profile questions.
5) The impersonator answered the dynamic pro-
file questions using the shared information. The
impersonator was required to search and locate
the correct answer from the shared information
and to guess answers to questions if they were not
shared. The authentication results were stored in
the database for analysis.
6) Steps 4 to 5 were repeated until all of the 18
dynamic profile questions were answered by the
impersonator.
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3.1.2 Credential Sharing With an Impersonator
via Phone (in Real-time)
A student may share answers to his dynamic pro-
file questions with a third party impersonator in real
time during an online examination session using a
smart phone. The participants were emailed the guid-
ance notes. The impersonator was taking the test on
a PC computer and communicated with the student
using Skype messenger installed on a smart phone.
The attack was simulated as described below:
1) At a scheduled time, an impersonator and a stu-
dent started a chat session on the phone using the
Skype instant messaging service.
2) A student shared his login details with the imper-
sonator who accessed the online course on a PC
using the shared login details.
3) In order to access the simulation online quiz,
the impersonator was randomly presented with
three dynamic profile questions on behalf of the
student.
4) The impersonator shared these questions and mul-
tiple choice options with the student on a mobile
phone using Skype in real time to collect the
correct answers.
5) The student identified and shared a correct answer
on Skype. The impersonator answered the ques-
tions and the authentication results were stored in
the database for analysis.
6) Steps 4 to 5 were repeated until all of the 18
dynamic profile questions were answered by the
impersonator.
4 Usability Results
This section presents the usability analysis of dynamic
profile questions in the context of online learning and
examinations. A total of 21 participants answered 378
questions for authentication in five weekly quizzes.
The response time to questions was not recorded as
they were created non-intrusively, non-distractingly in
the background. This method shows an increased effi-
ciency compared to pre-defined text-based and image-
based questions which require students to register their
answers. The effectiveness analysis is presented in the
following section.
4.1 Effectiveness of Dynamic Profile Questions
The effectiveness is considered to be the degree of
accuracy of the participants’ responses. In the context
of this study, it means that participants were able to
submit correct answers to dynamic profile questions
effectively with a low error rate. This was analyzed
from the data collected from the participants’ answers
to dynamic profile questions during weekly quizzes.
Table 2 shows the analysis of dynamic profile ques-
tions and the mean correct and incorrect answers. The
results show that a large number of answers were
correct. Out of 378 questions answered by 21 par-
ticipants, 376 (99.5 %) were correct, which shows
satisfactory effectiveness.
As shown in Table 2, the dynamic profile ques-
tions were based on the introduction and objectives,
assignment submissions, forum discussions, assign-
ment content, student reflection and grades. Each
question was presented with five multiple choice
options i.e. four distraction and a correct answer. For
example:
Table 2 Usability analysis: Effectiveness of dynamic profile
questions
Questions Correct Incorrect
1 Course objectives 1 21(100%) 0(0%)
2 Course objectives 2 21(100%) 0(0%)
3 Course objectives 3 21(100%) 0(0%)
4 Assignment 1 21(100%) 0(0%)
5 Assignment 2 21(100%) 0(0%)
6 Assignment 3 21(100%) 0(0%)
7 Assignment 4 21(100%) 0(0%)
8 Assignment 5 23 20(95.2%) 1(4.8%)
9 Forum Post 1 21(100%) 0(0%)
10 Forum Post 2 21(100%) 0(0%)
11 Forum Post 3 21(100%) 0(0%)
12 Assignment content 1 20(95.2%) 1(4.8%)
13 Assignment content 2 21(100%) 0(0%)
14 Assignment content 3 21(100%) 0(0%)
15 Assignment content 4 21(100%) 0(0%)
16 Student Reflection 21(100%) 0(0%)
17 Grades 1 21(100%) 0(0%)
18 Grades 2 21(100%) 0(0%)
Total 376(99.5%) 2(0.5%)
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Which one of the following statements below was
written by you as a course objective?
1. Distraction statement
2. Distraction statement
3. Distraction statement
4. Correct Answer
5. None of the above
The participants were required to recognize the
correct answer among the multiple choice options in
order to authenticate. The multiple choice options pro-
vided cues to the participants in order to identify their
answers, which resulted in 99.5% correct answers. As
presented in our previous study [42], the percent of
correct answers to pre-defined text-based and image-
based questions were 66% and 85% respectively. The
current results for dynamic profile questions suggest
a further increase. This is likely to be a result of
using multiple choice options and creating questions
associated with the students’ learning activities.
According to the usability scale described by [46],
70%-79% usability is acceptable, 80%-89% good, and
more than 90% exceptional. Therefore, 99.5% correct
answers to dynamic profile questions is an exceptional
effectiveness.
5 Security Results
This section reports the security analysis of dynamic
profile questions to evaluate impersonation attacks
when students and impersonators communicate through
email and mobile phone. The analysis was performed
on the data collected from simulation abuse case sce-
narios. In total, 21 participants performed email and
phone collusion attacks with two impersonators. The
findings of impersonation using email resulted in 29
(8%) correct answers. The findings of impersonation
using a mobile phone (Skype) resulted in 351 (93%)
correct answers. A detailed discussion on the findings
of the abuse case scenarios is presented below:
5.1 Impersonation Using Asynchronous Sharing
via Email
The security analysis of an impersonation attack in
this section is based on the number of correct answers
received when third party impersonators answered
dynamic profile questions on behalf of allocated stu-
dents and the information was shared asynchronously
through email. Table 3 “Email Impersonation” shows
the list of participants and the mean of correct and
incorrect answers submitted by an impersonator. The
email attack was performed before the phone attack to
evaluate participants’ ability to recall and share their
dynamic profile questions, which would help a third
party to impersonate them in an online examination.
Dynamic profile questions implemented five mul-
tiple choice options and the probability of a correct
answer by chance would be 1/5th or 20%. In the abuse
case scenario, the impersonators answered 29 (8%)
challenge questions correctly. This was largely based
on information shared via email and guessing by the
impersonators.
Of the 21 participants, only 7 were able to share
at least one correct question and answer with a third
party impersonator. In order to test the significance
of any differences in the means of correct answers
between students (during authentication) and third
party impersonators in an email abuse case scenario on
Table 3 Security analysis: Impersonation via phone
Question no. Content type Authentication
Correct Incorrect
1 Course objectives 1 20(95%) 1(5%)
2 Course objectives 2 20(95%) 1(5%)
3 Course objectives 3 21(100%) 0(0%)
4 Assignment 1 20(95%) 1(5%)
5 Assignment 2 20(95%) 1(5%)
6 Assignment 3 20(95%) 1(5%)
7 Assignment 4 21(100%) 0(0%)
8 Assignment 5 19(90%) 2(10%)
9 Forum Post 1 18(86%) 3(14%)
10 Forum Post 2 20(95%) 1(5%)
11 Forum Post 3 21(100%) 0(0%)
12 Assignment content 1 17(81%) 4(19%)
13 Assignment content 2 18(86%) 3(14%)
14 Assignment content 3 20(95%) 1(5%)
15 Assignment content 4 19(90%) 2(10%)
16 Student Reflection 18(86%) 3(14%)
17 Grades 1 (Assignment) 21(100%) 0(0%)
18 Grades 2 (Quiz) 18(86%) 3(14%)
Total 351(93%) 27(7%)
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the data shown in Table 2 “Email Impersonation” and
Table 3, a paired-sample t-test was performed. There
was a significant difference in the correct answers by
students (M = 99.5, SD = 2.4) and impersonators in
email abuse case attack (M = 7.8, SD = 14.9) con-
ditions t (20) = 28.41, p < 0.01. This suggests that
students were significantly less likely to share their
dynamic profile questions with a third party imperson-
ator via email; however, they recognized their correct
answers when presented with multiple choice options
during weekly quizzes reported in the effectiveness
analysis above.
5.2 Impersonation Using Real-time Sharing via Phone
The security analysis of an impersonation attack in
this section is based on the number of correct answers
received when third party impersonators answered
dynamic profile questions on behalf of allocated stu-
dents and the information was shared in real time
through a mobile phone. Table 3 “Phone Imperson-
ation” shows the analysis of the dynamic profile
questions and the mean correct and incorrect answers.
The findings revealed that a third party imperson-
ator answered 351 (93%) questions correctly. This
suggests that students were able to share correct
answers to their dynamic profile questions on the
mobile phone in real time. In order to test the signifi-
cance of any difference between correct answers sub-
mitted by students (during authentication) in weekly
quizzes and third party impersonators using mobile
phone, a paired-sample t-test was performed on the
data shown in Tables 2 and 4. There was a signif-
icant difference in the correct answers by students
(M=99.47, SD=2.4) and impersonators by phone
(M=92.8, SD=10) conditions t (20) = 3.49, p =
0.002. However, the mean of correct answers by
phone (M=92.8) indicates a high percentage of the
total answers. This identified a vulnerability of the
dynamic profile questions. A student can circum-
vent this approach if an online examination process
is not monitored or the response to questions during
authentication is not timed.
5.3 Security Performance and Response-time Factor
Traditional online examinations are often required to
be completed in an allocated time. Students are ex-
pected to authenticate and complete their online tests
Table 4 Security Analysis: Impersonation via Email/Phone
Participants Email impersonation Phone impersonation
Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect
1 9(50%) 9(50%) 18(100%) 0(0%)
2 0(0%) 18(100%) 12(67%) 6(33%)
3 0(0%) 18(100%) 13(72%) 5(28%)
4 1(6%) 17(94%) 18(100%) 0(0%)
5 0(0%) 18(100%) 18(100%) 0(0%)
6 1(6%) 17(94%) 14(78%) 4(22%)
7 0(0%) 18(100%) 16(89%) 2(11%)
8 0(0%) 18(100%) 18(100%) 0(0%)
9 0(0%) 18(100%) 18(100%) 0(0%)
10 5(28%) 13(72%) 16(89%) 2(11%)
11 0(0%) 18(100%) 18(100%) 0(0%)
12 0(0%) 18(100%) 18(100%) 0(0%)
13 0(0%) 18(100%) 17(94%) 1(6%)
14 0(0%) 18(100%) 16(89%) 2(11%)
15 5(28%) 13(72%) 16(89%) 2(11%)
16 1(6%) 17(94%) 18(100%) 0(0%)
17 0(0%) 18(100%) 17(94%) 1(6%)
18 0(0%) 18(100%) 16(89%) 2(11%)
19 0(0%) 18(100%) 18(100%) 0(0%)
20 0(0%) 18(100%) 18(100%) 0(0%)
21 7(39%) 11(61%) 18(100%) 0(0%)
Total 29 (8%) 349 (92%) 351 (93%) 27 (7%)
on or before the allocated time. In a practical situation,
when a third party impersonator communicates with a
student to share answers to dynamic profile questions
using a mobile phone or email, the response time may
change. It is anticipated that the response time of a
genuine student and an impersonator may be different
when answering these questions.
In order to test the significance of any differences in
the mean response time to dynamic profile questions
between a genuine student and a third party imper-
sonator, a paired-sample t-test was performed on the
data shown in Tables 2 and 4. There was a signif-
icant difference in the scores for the response time
of a genuine student during authentication (M=39.69,
SD=104.07) and a third party during impersonation
by phone (M=290.47, SD=90.39) conditions t (377)
= -35.55, p < 0.01.
The impersonation abuse case scenario via phone
was simulated using Skype instant messaging. It is
anticipated that verbal communication via phone may
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Fig. 2 Example of
dynamic profile questions
be quicker than texting. However, reading a ques-
tion with 5 multiple choice options may still require
extra time for an impersonator, compared to a gen-
uine student who could choose a correct answer in a
shorter time. Furthermore, dependent upon the ques-
tion design, some questions may be challenging to
describe verbally as shown in Fig. 2.
In order to test the significance of any trend in the
response time on the data presented in Tables 2 and 4,
a one-way ANOVA was performed with linear con-
trasts. A trend was found for response time by students
and a third party impersonator F (1,754) = 1250.96,
p < 0.01. A Pearson correlation was performed on
the data presented in Tables 2 and 4 to test the direc-
tion of the trend in response time by a student and a
third party r = 0.79, n = 756, p < 0.01. This indicates
an increasing trend. The above findings show that the
response time of a genuine student is shorter than that
of a third party impersonator.
6 Conclusion
The study reported in this paper implemented dynamic
profile questions in a real online course. These
questions were created non-intrusively and non-
distractingly in the background during a student’s
learning period. This increased the efficiency com-
pared to text-based and image-based questions. The
findings revealed a significantly increased effective-
ness, i.e. 99.5% correct answers. These questions are
usable and influence impersonation when a student
and impersonator communicate asynchronously via
email. The security analysis revealed that dynamic
profile questions may not influence impersonation
attacks when a student and an impersonator use a
smart phone to communicate in real time during the
exam session. However, there was a significant differ-
ence (p < 0.01) in response time between a genuine
student and a third party impersonator. This may be
implemented as an additional factor on which to base
reports of impersonation attacks. The response time
factor can influence students from sharing access cre-
dentials with impersonators in real time to perform
collusion attacks.
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Appendix: Dynamic Profile Questions
Q.1 which one of the following statement below
were written by you?
• I am currently in second year of Eco-
nomics Degree
• I have a degree in Chemistry from Trinity
College Dublin, Ireland and pursued a part-
time researchMSc in Computational Chem-
istry with Trinity College. 3 publications.
• I used SQL during the second year of my
course a few years ago, along with Java
(JDBC)
• Currently I’m enrolled at the MSc Com-
puter Science course, previously I studied
BSC (Hons) in Computers and Electronics
at the Northampton University.
• None of the above
Q.2 which one of the following statement below
were written by you as a course objective
• I have over seven year experience in the IT
sector, I’m currently working as database
administrator/programmer
• I am doing this course as part of my CPD
required in my workplace
• I would like to pursue this course in order
to learn more for my field of work and
have more knowledge for advancement.
• I want to do this course because i can
work as a freelancer after doing php as i
have seen so many projects in Freelancer,
Odesk and Elance and i already have some
experience of Sql.
• None of the above
Q.3 which of the following statement were written
in your introduction email?
• For networking I need to know some of
scripting languages and so I want to learn
php.
• I work in a non-IT related field- I am a
cook.
• Have already got the basics in HND for
PHP and MySQL but thought this would
be a good opportunity to refresh memory
and expand on this
• Recently my employer have introduced
software products and web pages written
in PHP and using MySQL databases so it
will be highly beneficial for my career to
familiarize myself with this technologies.
• None of the above
Q.4 which one of the following discussion posts
were made by you?
• I just completed the week 1 quiz and all
the contents of week 1. I can’t access to
week 2, Am I too late for it, or is there any
specific reason for it?
• When I run the page that should execute
Hello World. I’m getting an error saying
the URL was not found on the server
• I’ve tried the following: Test after starting
of Apache (andMySQL), go to the address
http://localhost/ or http://127.0.0.1/ in your
browser and examine all of the XAMPP
examples and tools. but all I get is a HTTP
404 not found page
• Did you save the example1.php in your
xampp folder correctly? (i.e. make a new
folder calledmyproject in the htdocs folder)
• None of the above
Q.5 which one of the following discussion posts
were made by you?
• I have now completed week 1 assignment.
Can I have access to week 1 quiz?
• I have managed to install XAMPP but I
cannot connect to MySQL module. I have
tried to uninstall and reinstall but noth-
ing is working. I had installed MYSQL
database previously.
• Thanks Mr Abrar but I do not think that is
going to be necessary. I have managed to
install XAMPP on another computer.
• Hi Evens, It works for me but it is not is
English. AND. Many thanks Chelsea, not
a great start but you cracked it.
• None of the above
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Q.6 which one of the following discussion posts
were made by you?
• I found this too. Googling it, as I under-
stand it what is happening is when the
script first runs the $i variable is not initial-
ized, effectively resulting in a null being
passed in to the switch statement
• You have stated that the second example is
the same as the first one. So how come you
have used quotation marks for the second
example?
• Normally port 443 is used for secure host
and accessible using https
• You nailed it. Perfect. Actually if the port
is used by another service, apache won’t
start as the port is already taken.
• None of the above
Q.7 your score for the week 1 quiz was:
• Within the 60%-69% range
• Within the 80%-100% range
• Within the 40% -59% Range
• Within the 70%-79% range
• Less than 40%
Q.8 which one of the following assignments have
you submitted in week 1?
• Write a PHP program to assign your name
to $myname and qualification to $qualifi-
cation variables and display the output on
page with on two separate lines.
• List examples of logical operators and pro-
vide evidence with php programs?
• Write a php function to compute standard
deviation of data array?
• Write a php program to connect to
database using PDO and retrieve data
using select statement?
• None of the above
Q.9 which one of the following assignments have
you submitted in week 1?
• Write a php program to demonstrate dif-
ference between static, private and public
class?
• Write a PHP program to assign any two
numbers to two variables and display their
sum on screen.
• Write a phpprogram for traffic lights control
• Write a php program to submit data using
form $ POST and insert into MySQL
database?
• None of the above
Q.10 which one of the following assignments have
you submitted in week 1?
• Write a PHP program to assign any num-
ber to a variable and display the value
using pre-decrement operator (–). Check
PHP operators for help.
• Write a PHP program to compute factorial
of a number n?
• Write a PHP program to demonstrate post
decrement
• Write a PHP program to compare pre-
increment with post-increment
• None of the above
Q.11 which one of the following PHP code belongs
to your assignment?
• while ($minNum < $maxNum){
• echo ”Perform addition: $a + $b =
”.$addition.””;
• foreach($data s $dataitem)
• $sum = $numberone + $numbertwo;
• None of the above
Q.12 which one of the following PHP code belongs
to your assignment?
• $a= ++$a;
• $sum(a+b);
• $addition = $a + $b;
• addFunction(10,10);
• None of the above
Q.13 your score for the assignment 1 was:
• Within the 40% -69% Range
• Within the 70%-79% range
• Within the 80%-89% range
• Within the 90%-100% range
• None of the above
Q.14 which one of the following reflection posts
were made by you?
• I have learnt to create php classes and
objects
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• I have learnt to create my first PHP page
and coding, assign variables and the differ-
ent arithmetic operations.
• I have learnt to create database connection
to backend using PHP in week 6
• I have learnt email function using php,which
is very relevant to my ongoing project
• None of the above
Q.15 which one of the following assignments have
you submitted in week 2?
• Write a PHP program to develop grade-
book using array
• Write a PHP program to display your
favorite fruit from the given choices:Mango,
Orange, Apple, Plum, Cherry, pineapple,
kewi using PHP Switch statement.
• Write a PHP program to display odd num-
ber for array list
• Write a PHP program to sort an array list
• None of the above
Q.16 which one of the following assignments have
you submitted in week 2?
• Write a PHP program using an indexed
array to store name of cars: Honda, BMW,
Toyota, Ford, Audi and Fiat and print them
all on screen line by line.
• Develop a bubble sort program using PHP
• Develop push and pop functions of stack
using PHP program
• Write a php program to connect to
database using PDO and retrieve data
using select statement?
• None of the above
Q.17 which one of the following PHP code belongs
to your assignment 2?
• print largest($array);
• While(NOT $thelargetnumber)
• function getLarget($array =array());
• $cars[0]=”Honda”;
• None of the above
Q.18 which one of the following PHP code belongs
to your assignment 2?
• echo $cars[0].” ”.$cars[1].” ”.$cars[2].”
”.$cars[3].” ”.$cars[4].” ”.$cars[5];
• foreach($numbers in $numbersArray())
• echo $find favorite fruite($fruitArray);
• Do While ($num[0] < $num[1])
• None of the above
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